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The concept of solidarity was first brought to prominence within social science 
by  Emile Durkheim when The Division of Labour in Society appeared in 1893, 
and it has received sporadic attention within the discipline of Sociology ever 
since (see Crow, 2002). However, within the discipline of Politics there has 
been no comparable interest, as Steinar Stjernø points out in his recent 
history of the concept of solidarity (Stjernø, 2004, 20). The appearance of 
books by Stjernø and Hauke Brunkhorst (Brunkhorst, 2005) has gone some 
way towards rectifying this lacuna, one which is all the more surprising given 
the ubiquity of the word in twentieth-century political life. “Solidarity” seems 
to have been confined to the realm of rhetoric while serious theoretical work 
has concentrated on other aspects of political association such as democracy, 
nationalism, community, multiculturalism, and human rights. In essence, 
solidarity is the feeling of reciprocal sympathy and responsibility amongst 
members of a group which promotes mutual support. As such it has 
subjective and emotional elements, and this helps to explain its conceptual 
neglect, for, as John Baker et al have argued, within a liberal theoretical 
framework, solidarity is associated with ‘love’ and ‘friendship’, essentially 
private matters which individuals should be left to work out for themselves 
(Baker et al, 2004, 28). However, there should be no justification for failing to 
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give due consideration to the nature of the collective action which has helped  
shape institutions and policies within states, and which is now reconstituting 
itself in response to the challenge of globalization. 
The advance of individualism poses a clear threat to the idea of 
solidarity, as Stjernø points out (Stjernø, 2004, 2). A serious concern about 
the consequences of the weakening of social bonds has drawn an energetic 
academic response with the emergence of communitarian thought in the 
United States (Etzioni, 1998 and 2004; Crow, 2002, 43-48), and also the 
widespread impact of Robert Putnam’s social capital thesis (Putnam, 2001 and 
2004; Halpern, 2005). From a European perspective, the association of social 
solidarity with the achievement of the welfare state (Baldwin, 1990) creates 
obvious problems now that the high-tax welfare state model appears to have 
been replaced with a low-tax ‘competition state’ (Jessop, 2002). State-centred 
conceptions of democracy suggest that a weakening of collective social 
provision must mean a diminution of solidarity. This applies to Stjernø, who 
defines solidarity as ‘the preparedness to share resources with others by 
personal contribution to those in struggle or in need through taxation and 
redistribution organised by the state’ (Stjernø, 2004, 2). However, although 
the emphasis on preparedness to share reminds us that feelings must be 
acted on if the idea of solidarity is to have any substance, his insistence on 
one particular form of ‘delivery’ is problematic. The move away from the 
Keynesian welfare state model does not necessarily mean any lessening of 
preparedness to share, for the general direction of economic policy has been 
dictated by the neo-liberal restructuring of the world economy. Even states 
with the strongest solidaristic traditions have been unable to defend the old 
institutions (Wilde, 1994, 39-68). Voters will not vote for a high tax strategy if 
a consensus exists among policy-makers that it will have disastrous economic 
consequences, and in many cases this consensus has been so dominant that 
voters have not even had that option available to them. The emphasis on the 
state’s redistributive role in creating solidarity also fails to take into account 
the negative potential of state provision. Reliance on the centralised, 
bureaucratic processes of social protection can create a dependency culture 
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rather than a solidaristic one. So, the demise (or scaling back) of the welfare 
state should not in itself be taken as an indication of a collapse of solidarity. 
There can, of course, be no doubt that neo-liberal globalisation has 
transformed the social relations of production everywhere. In the old 
industrial heartlands of Europe and North America it has swept away heavy 
industries, often with devastating effects on communities, and reduced the 
power of labour movements. However, the damage done to traditional forms 
of solidarity does not preclude the development of new forms. These new 
forms include organisations directly addressing the global issues and 
operating supranationally, as well as myriad local networks responding to new 
needs arising out of rapid and widespread social change.1 One of the 
important research questions is the extent to which local forms of solidarities 
implicitly or explicitly connect with the wider global issues. It is also important 
to explore the possibility that the forces of globalisation that have devastated 
traditional forms of solidarity may have provoked new forms which place the 
idea of human solidarity on an emerging agenda of global politics. The 
cosmopolitan ideal, first expressed in Stoic philosophy more than two 
thousand years ago (Heater, 2002, 26-52), may, for the first time, have a 
political platform.  
In the next section I will contextualise the issues surrounding the idea 
of solidarity by looking at what has endured and what has changed since 
Durkheim’s original contribution. I will then discuss some of the recent 
approaches to the concept, highlighting unresolved problems and promising 
areas for future exploration.  
 
 
SITUATING SOLIDARITY 
 
When Durkheim argued that organic solidarity was a normal development of 
the social interaction typical in the modern division of labour he was issuing a 
challenge, not only to the prevailing sociological views of Tönnies and 
Spencer, but also to the prevailing political views of both the conservative 
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Right and the revolutionary Left. What Durkheim regarded as ‘abnormalities’ 
preventing solidarity emerging within the framework of private property, such 
as industrial crises and class struggle (Durkheim, 1964, 353-373), Marxists 
took to be inevitable features of a fundamentally antagonistic social system. 
The revolutionary Left emphasised class solidarity as a means to a social 
revolution that would abolish capitalism, only then opening the way to the 
social solidarity of communist society. The conservative Right, terrified by this 
threat, saw only authoritarian solutions to the question of social order. 
Nevertheless, a political movement dedicated to the advance of social 
solidarity erupted on to the scene shortly after the appearance of Durkheim’s 
book, led by the Radical leader Léon Bourgeois, author of the programmatic 
text, Solidarité, (1896). According to Hayward the ‘Solidarist’ movement was 
so successful that solidarity became the ‘official social philosophy of the Third 
Republic’ in the period leading up to the First World War (Hayward, 1961).2 
The idea was popular among social liberals who recognised that the original 
republican commitment to “fraternity” was not being met in a society 
operating on the principles of laisser-faire economics. Solidarism was an 
attempt to overcome class antagonisms around a programme of social 
progress for all, so that individualism could be reconciled with a sense of 
collective responsibility (Hayward, 1959, 269).  
Although there were parallel movements from social liberals in other 
countries (Baldwin, 1990, 34-5), in France there were particular reasons why 
this concern should revolve around the concept of solidarity. Not only was the 
affinity with the republican principle of ‘fraternity’ important, but it reflected 
the original working-class use of the word in the 1840s as part of a 
democratic demand for  social inclusion through wider political and social 
rights (Magraw, 1992, 52; Hayward, 1959, 277). The savage suppression of 
the Paris Commune of 1871 drove sections of the working class in the 
direction of revolutionary class conflict, and in the struggle to establish the 
legitimacy of the Republic the Radicals sought to heal the wounds and create 
a new national solidarity. Solidarism as a movement achieved only limited 
success due to the strength of the opposition to its Right and Left, and this 
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clash of solidarities was evident in the other industrialised states. On the one 
hand the class struggles were too pronounced for successful movements of 
social solidarity to emerge, but, on the other, the grip of nationalist sentiment 
was so strong that socialist movements readily supported the war efforts of 
their states in 1914. 
The paradox at the heart of solidarity has long been evident. On the 
one hand it has connotations of unity and universality, emphasising 
responsibility for others and the feeling of togetherness. On the other hand it 
exhibits itself most forcefully in antagonism to other groups, often in ways 
which eschew the possibility of compromise. Yet following the period of 
sustained economic prosperity and full employment in the 1950s and 1960s it 
seemed to many from the social liberal and social democratic traditions that 
genuine progress towards social solidarity was being made in a consensus 
around the welfare state (Baldwin, 1999, 288-299; Stjernø, 2004, 251). State 
regulation appeared to have consigned major economic crises to history, 
independent pressure groups flourished as intermediaries between the citizen 
and the state, and the welfare state promised an end to abject deprivation – 
all developments consistent with Durkheim’s prescriptions. In addition, the 
development of the European Economic Community appeared to realise 
Durkheim’s vision that ‘beyond this country, there is another country in the 
process of formation, enveloping our national country: that of Europe, or 
humanity’ (in Lukes, 1973, 350). Imperialism was coming to a close, and, at 
the global level, the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights, agreed by the United 
Nations, signalled a shared aspiration to universal social obligation.  
However, even during the long period of prosperity which lasted until 
the mid-1970s it is evident that many of Durkheim’s ‘abnormalities’ were 
clearly still in place in most of the economically advanced countries. 
Prejudices based on class, ethnicity and gender gave rise to widespread 
discrimination, and even within close communities the solidarity of the 
majority all too frequently gave rise to alienation of the minority. In countries 
with a strong tradition of labour solidarity, this was often accompanied by a 
range of exclusionary practices. In other words, all that was “solid” was not 
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necessarily harmonious or fair. Nevertheless there was a tremendous social 
cost to pay when those established social bonds were devastated as a result 
of the economic restructuring which followed the end of the post-war boom, 
particularly in the creation of the ‘new poor’ (Bauman, 2001, 72-80). Looking 
beyond the affluent states to the world economy, the processes of 
restructuring, governed by the WTO/IMF/World Bank elites, have left the 
poorest even poorer. Solidarities based on occupation, community and 
traditional culture have been severely tested during this period, but these 
changes have also provoked a new questioning about the social 
consequences of unfettered competition. The rise of new social movements 
has opened the possibility of new forms of solidarity through ‘the 
democratization of everyday life’ (Melucci, 1989, 165-179), which may lead on 
to ‘bigger’ questions about the values and goals of the social system as a 
whole (Melucci, 1996, 22-41). Solidarity develops in struggles against 
systematic discrimination on a variety of grounds, in ecological movements 
extending solidarity to future generations, and in movements dedicated to the 
welfare of other life-forms. In response to the neo-liberal governance of the 
world economy new movements have coalesced, sometimes in long-term 
umbrella movements like the Social Forums, at other times in short-lived but 
influential campaigns like Make Poverty History. An extensive research agenda 
suggests itself, with the tasks of assessing the strengths and endurance of 
these new solidarities, their ability to articulate with each other and with older 
movements, and their impact on democratic renewal, public discourse, and 
social policy. At the global level, the normative goal of human solidarity is 
raised.  
  
 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 
 
Just as the Solidarist movement in France was a response to deep divisions in 
a republic that had failed to realise its foundational aspirations to liberty, 
equality and fraternity, now, at the beginning of a new century, the call for 
 7
solidarity on a global scale is a response to a deeply divided world which has 
failed to realise the promise of the United Nation Declaration of Human 
Rights. Brunkhorst sees a progressive development from the first struggles to 
establish modern human rights at the national level in the French and 
American Revolutions to the demand for the establishment of the democratic 
constitutional principle on a global scale. He argues that the modern 
conception of democracy is the heir of two traditions, the Judeo-Christian idea 
of brotherly solidarity and the Greco-Roman idea of civic solidarity 
(Brunkhorst, 2005, 55), and that democratic constitutionalism helped to 
overcome what he terms the ‘dual inclusion’ problem. The development of 
individualisation appears to exclude social communication, but democracy 
solves this problem and makes solidarity egalitarian through its inclusive 
guarantee of basic rights. In this way individual inclusion is won, but social 
inclusion is threatened by the huge disparities in power flowing from the 
market system; again this problem is resolved through the exercise of popular 
sovereignty in producing the welfare state (Brunkhorst, 2005, 81-101). 
Although these achievements are threatened by neo-liberalism, the struggle 
towards the extension of democratic power in the global sphere permits us to 
glimpse a trajectory towards global community. The goal of the struggle is 
the completion of the constitutional project of 1789, ‘the self-
constitutionalisation of democratic solidarity’ (Brunkhorst, 2005, 162). For 
Brunkhorst, as for many liberal institutionalists in international relations 
theory, the European Union is perceived to be important in lighting the way 
for the emergence of a global legal community (Brunkhorst, 2005, 163-176).  
The potential of the European Union in extending solidarity and healing 
ancient enmities has been given significance by a number of social theorists 
who are nevertheless well aware of its democratic deficiencies and its 
bureaucratic mien. For Jürgen  Habermas, whose remarks on the potential of 
the European Union to engender social solidarity are strongly reminiscent of 
Durkheim’s appeals for social regulation (Habermas, 2001, 74-77), the EU 
opens the possibility of developing a post-national conception of citizenship 
cemented by a ‘pay-off’ in terms of social justice. It also presents the 
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possibility of developing institutions that fulfil the normative promise of his 
work on communicative rationality. His discourse ethics presupposes the 
absolute individual freedom of people when making claims and reaching 
agreements, but also recognises that social consensus can only be formed 
with ‘the empathy of each person in the situation for everyone, which is 
derived from solidarity’ (Habermas, 1990, 247). Nancy Fraser adds to this a 
requirement that the concrete circumstances of ‘dominated persons’ must be 
taken into account so that the ways in which we interpret and communicate 
discourse is not the preserve of those who are from the privileged group who 
helped to create that discourse; she terms this ‘an ethic of solidarity…from 
the standpoint of the collective concrete other’ (Fraser, 1986, 425-429). It 
should be noted that Habermas is careful to distance himself from classical 
appeals to human essence, instead grounding his ethics in the 
‘postmetaphysical’ realities of ‘intersubjectively shared forms of life’ 
(Habermas, 1990, 247). Likewise Fraser distances herself from an ethics of 
care, which also rests on essentialist assumptions.  
One of the problems raised by the importance attached to 
constitutionalism by both Brunkhorst and Habermas is the remoteness of 
democratic and administrative institutions from the everyday concerns of 
citizens. How can the subjective feeling for solidarity connect with ideas for 
democratic renewal? Craig Calhoun notes two problems with adopting a 
‘purely political’ conception of human beings; first, it misses out on the myriad 
forms of solidarity achieved outside political organisations, and second, it 
overestimates the mobilising potential of grand institutional ideas (Calhoun, 
2002. 98). We can see both these problems in the general indifference to the 
democratic deficit within the EU and the legitimation problems exposed by the 
abortive attempt to launch a Constitution. So, while it undoubtedly true that 
democratic renewal is a prerequisite for the furtherance of solidarity, it is only 
distantly linked to the real world of solidaristic movements. Perhaps a ‘step’ is 
needed between the politics of competing interests and the goal of solidarity, 
and Ulrich Beck seems closer to the mark when he argues that the challenge 
of cosmopolitan Europe is to establish the reality of reconciliation (Beck, 
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2006, 163-77), in which reconciliation prepares the ground for the future 
development of solidarity. 
Axel Honneth offers a sophisticated inter-subjectivist analysis of 
solidarity in The Struggle for Recognition, in which he stresses the moral force 
inherent in the expectation of recognition at the levels of rights and societal 
solidarity. It is a moral feeling of indignation against various forms of 
disrespect that acts as an important motive force for members of movements 
in struggle. He complains that social science has tended to reduce motives for 
rebellion, protest and resistance to categories of ‘interest’, with the interests 
emerging out of objective inequalities in the distribution of opportunities 
(Honneth, 1996, 161). He is not suggesting that this basically utilitarian model 
is wrong, but that a fixation with ‘interests’ has obscured the significance of 
moral feelings (Honneth, 1996, 166). This raises the key question of what 
sort of moral claims may be justified. Honneth accepts that the significance of 
particular struggles has to be measured in terms of the positive or negative 
contribution that each makes to the realisation of ‘undistorted forms of 
recognition’ (Honneth, 1996, 170), which points to a strong link with 
Habermas’s discourse ethics. Ultimately, solidarity is achieved when each 
individual understands that she or he is ‘esteemed’ by all citizens to the same 
degree. Solidarity is understood as ‘an interactive relationship in which 
subjects mutually sympathise with their various different ways of life because, 
among themselves, they esteem each other symmetrically,’ while societal 
solidarity is achieved when ‘every member of a society is in a position to 
esteem himself or herself’ (Honneth, 1996, 128-129). When speaking of 
people esteeming each other ‘symmetrically’ Honneth refers to a situation in 
which we view each other in the light of values that allow the abilities and 
traits of the other to appear significant for shared practice, thereby inspiring a 
genuine concern for the other person rather than simply exercising a passive 
tolerance. In this respect his normative perspective is shared by Alain 
Touraine, for whom the idea of ‘living together’ in the title of his book, Can 
We Live Together? transcends mere tolerance of ‘the other’ but invokes 
solidarity as the active support for the expression of multiple values and 
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projects in a multicultural society by a new type of Subject (Touraine, 2000, 
141).  
The approaches discussed above share an unwillingness to dwell on an 
idea of a shared human nature and shared human needs which might supply 
criteria for judging which values, projects and movements are progressive 
and which are not. Richard Rorty is particularly vehement in opposing 
attempts to identify human solidarity with ‘humanity as such’, an identification 
which he derides as ‘impossible…an awkward attempt to secularise the idea 
of being one with God’ (Rorty, 1996, 198). However, when Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity appeared in 1983, his optimistic insistence that moral 
progress had taken place and was in the direction of greater human solidarity 
did much to revive academic interest in the concept (Rorty, 1996, 192). Rorty 
insists that our moral obligations to others derive from the fact that we share 
a tangible group identity, and that the appeal to specific identity will always 
be more effective than an appeal to our common humanity. So, he argues, if 
we want to elicit sympathy for the plight of young black city dwellers in the 
USA it is more persuasive, ‘morally as well as politically’, to describe them as 
our fellow Americans rather our fellow human beings (Rorty, 1996, 191). This 
privileging of nationality is highly contentious and difficult to square with the 
wider goal of human solidarity (Wilde, 2004b, 136-139). Rorty argues that 
greater solidarity is achieved when we learn more about unfamiliar people 
(description) and become more sensitive to their suffering, in the process 
learning more about ourselves (redescription) (Rorty, 1996, xvi). Rorty says 
that the task of promoting this enlightened consciousness is not the task of 
theory but one for the reporters and creative writers, and he emphasises the 
significant role that the novel can play. This is an important point, for the 
aesthetic dimension explores the subjective apprehension of social 
relationships, particularly in conflictual situations, in a way which often eludes 
the social scientific emphasis on structures and interests.3  
Despite his antipathy to essentialism of all kinds, Rorty feels the need 
to fall back on something that does unite us as human being – ‘recognition of 
a common susceptibility to humiliation is the only social bond that is needed’ 
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(Rorty, 1996, 91 – his emphasis). The ‘essential’ feeling which Rorty selects is 
both arbitrary and negative, but in making this move he opens up for 
theoretical consideration the issue he wants to suppress, the idea of a shared 
human nature, as Norman Geras has pointed out (Geras, 1995, 89-90). 
Ultimately Rorty is appealing to a shared human feeling that can serve to 
promote empathy and overcome indifference. The reluctance to embrace a 
humanistic ethics based on a normative conception of human nature has 
prevailed for decades in social science, and the problems it leaves become 
apparent when dealing with the idea of human solidarity. Honneth  recognises 
that the claims made by various social groups in their struggles for 
recognition carry with them moral claims, but he has been reluctant (so far) 
to concede that it is difficult to judge the strengths of competing claims 
without an overarching humanist ethics (Wilde, 2004a). Touraine recognises 
the importance of renewing the political sphere by an infusion of ethics, but 
he has very little to say about the content of such an ethics (Wilde, 2007). In 
contrast, I suggest, contra Habermas, that there is something to be said 
about returning to classical notions of eudaemonia, renewed by 
psychoanalytical insights developed in the twentieth century, and Erich 
Fromm is the key figure here (Wilde, 2004b). 
Fromm’s humanistic ethics were first set out in Man For Himself, 
published in 1947. Linking his approach to the tradition of Aristotle and 
Spinoza, Fromm asks what it is that makes us human and concludes that self-
awareness, reason and imagination have disrupted the harmony which 
characterises  the existence of other animals. He argues that the emergence 
of reason ‘has created a dichotomy within man which forces him to strive 
everlastingly for new solutions’ (Fromm, 2003, 28-29). The human being is 
both part of nature and yet is obliged always to transcend nature, and this 
tension is marked by what he terms ‘existential dichotomies’ – the knowledge 
of our certain death versus the richness of life, the awareness of the vast 
potentialities of humanity versus our individually limited capacities, our 
solitary uniqueness versus the fact that we cannot bear to be alone. In the 
light of these dichotomies we are thereby impelled to seek a new ‘harmony’, 
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and this is where the ethics comes in. We can either choose regressive paths, 
such as blind submission to authority or tribalism of various sorts, or we 
choose the productive paths through the development of our inherent human 
potentialities, of which he specifies reason, love, and productive work (ibid, 
32). If we choose the productive path it is possible for individuals to achieve 
fulfilment in a condition of ‘relatedness to and solidarity with his fellow men’ 
(ibid, p.9). A society which wishes to promote such solidarity should foster the 
productive potentials, and the aim of all social and political activities should 
be the unfolding and growth of every person (ibid, 171). 
As a psychoanalyst, Fromm was clear that the cost for individuals in 
failing to realise the productive potentials was ‘dysfunction and unhappiness’, 
and that societies which suppress those potentials will suffer from a ‘socially 
patterned defect’ (ibid, 164-166). Although he supported a range of schemes 
and policies which might promote greater solidarity he did not do so in a 
systematic way. However, his work can be used to build a theoretical 
framework from which work could be conducted on how such potentials are 
realised and thwarted at a range of levels, from everyday life to the global, 
and how particular solidarities relate to the wider goal of human solidarity. 
‘Faith’ also plays an important part in Fromm’s social theory, not in a 
conventional religious sense but rather as an ineliminable aspect of human 
life which develops either progressively in the direction of faith in our own 
potential, the potential of others, and ultimately all humankind, or in the 
direction of irrational faith in such things as leaders, machines, or success 
(ibid., 148-157). The argument that faith is a necessary part of reason 
overcomes the modern sundering of the two, and the emphasis on productive 
faith opens up the possibility of dialogue between theistic and non-theistic 
ethical systems. Even though the divisiveness of religious affiliation has been 
and remains all too evident, there remains a shared ethical commitment to 
reciprocity embodied in the various expression of ‘the Golden Rule’ (Küng, 
1997, 98-99), which, despite problems in its application (Appiah, 2006, 60-63) 
offers a basis for reconciliation between faiths, both theistic and secular. One 
of the strengths of Brunkhorst’s book is the careful analysis of the 
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development of the idea of brotherhood in the Judeo-Christian tradition, for it 
reveals a protracted struggle towards the idea of power in the people 
(Brunkhorst, 2005, 23-54). Stjernø, too, highlights the importance of 
specifically Christian ethics in the early and modern development of the idea 
of solidarity (Stjernø, 2004, 60-85, 287-326).  
Today the idea of human solidarity has resurfaced in the emerging 
debates surrounding the idea of cosmopolitanism. Peter Waterman relates the 
social movements that have developed in response to globalisation to ‘a 
complex solidarity for a complex globality’ (Waterman, 2001, 235-239). He 
identifies six characteristics of solidarity – identity, substitution, 
complementarity, reciprocity, affinity, and restitution – each of which is 
needed if we are to move closer to international solidarity. However, each one 
taken in isolation can be problematic, perhaps reinforcing particularism or else 
not seriously engaging with the demands for thoroughgoing social change. 
Waterman is particularly concerned that international solidarity will not be 
achieved purely out of a sense of moral duty but rather as the rational 
expression of shared interest. However attractive this ‘bottom up’ approach to 
global solidarity, it begs the question of how far such solidarity can develop in 
a world in which the interests of powerful states prevail in a competitive inter-
state system. A more ‘top down’ perspective is offered in international 
relations theory by advocates of ‘solidarism’ (Dunne and Wheeler, 1999), 
which envisages states acting ultimately on behalf of all humanity to secure 
fundamental rights. However, even sympathetic writers such as Nicholas 
Wheeler and Alex Bellamy concede that ‘it is not states but global civil society 
that is the principal agent promoting humanitarian values in global politics 
(Wheeler and Bellamy, 2005, 575-576). Interventions in Kosovo and Iraq 
dramatically highlight the difficulty of elucidating and implementing agreed 
principles on humanitarian interventions, and yet they also demonstrate the 
imperative of striving for new rules of conduct in international society 
(Linklater, 2005, 84-109).   
Calhoun, as mentioned above, also links cosmopolitanism with 
solidarity, but argues that a transformation of public discourse is required if 
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the goals of postnational democrats such as Habermas (2001) and Held 
(1995) to be achieved (Calhoun, 2002, 96-109). Calhoun is adamant that the 
cause of solidarity will not be advanced by merely adopting an ‘attenuated’ or 
‘soft’ cosmopolitanism that is not prepared to challenge a capitalism driven by 
global neo-liberalism. In appealing for clarity in identifying the forces that 
oppose human solidarity Calhoun touches on the paradox referred to above. 
In the absence of a  ’War of the Worlds’ scenario, as Appiah characterises it 
(Appiah, 2006, 98), where is the external enemy that can stimulate the new 
solidarity? Clearly there are forces working against the advance of solidarity, 
but in terms of political confrontation these global economic elites have until 
recently proved elusive and shadowy, something that must clearly change if 
cosmopolitan solidarity is to develop (Sklair, 2002, 295-301). Waterman’s 
complex model indicates that such solidarity cannot operate as did the 
spatially-bound, tightly organised solidarities of the past. Rather it would 
require more variegated forms, involving complex mediations and a rolling 
process of articulation and re-articulation. The pursuit of human solidarity 
would also require an explicit ethical movement, which is perhaps harder to 
envisage. Zygmunt Bauman, who has, at times, adopted a pessimistic tone 
about the ephemeral nature of contemporary social bonds, offers greater 
encouragement in the final chapter of Community, entitled “Many Cultures, 
One Humanity?” (Bauman, 2002, 124-143), in which he endorses the idea of 
a search for a common humanity. The ‘solidarity of explorers’ is achieved 
through individuals and groups going out in search of the best form of 
humanity, and bringing back the findings from their expeditions to a long 
dialogue in which all voices are heard and comparisons can be made. Bauman 
regards this is a true political process in which truly universal humanity 
accommodates the plurality of the forms of human life and makes pluralism 
serve the cause of humanity. There is, of course, an element of utopianism 
here, but one which is not disconnected from real possibilities for the 
development of human solidarity. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1  In this respect the forthcoming book by Ray Pahl and Liz Spencer, Re-Thinking Friendship: Hidden 
Solidarities Today (Princeton: Princeton University Press) should make an important contribution. Pahl 
flags up the argument in an article in The New Statesman (2005). 
  
2   Durkheim’s account of solidarity has more radical implications than the limited reformism of the 
Solidarist movement (Stedman Jones, 2001, 94; Lukes, 1973, 172-178), but they share a broadly social 
liberal perspective. 
 
3 Crow quotes Michael Ignatief’s view that painters and writers have generally evoked solidarity more 
successfully than social scientists, but (rightly) insists that the social scientist has a vital role to play in 
analysing the conditions in which greater solidarity can be achieved (Crow, 2002, 132). Giles Gunn  
explores the cultural expressions of human solidarity in the age of globalization in Beyond Solidarity 
(2001)  
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